Henry A. Kissinger - North Korea's Nuclear Program Cannot Be ... - About

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Saved by 1 people (0 private), first by anonymouse user on 2009-06-09

Transtracker on 2009-06-09 - Tags WMD , nukes , proliferation

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De facto acquiescence in a North Korean nuclear program would require a reconsideration of U.S. strategic planning. More emphasis would need to be given to missile defense. It would be essential to redesign the American deterrent strategy in a world of multiple nuclear powers -- a challenge unprecedented in our experience. The enhanced role of non-state actors with respect to terrorism would have to be addressed. The concepts of deterrence against state actors are familiar, though not in a world of multiple nuclear powers. They have little or no relevance to non-state actors operating by stealth.

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on 2009-06-09 by TransTracker

Unfortunately, it appears that we lack the resolve to do anything other than acquiesce. At the same time, Gates has cancelled missile defense and all major weapon modernization efforts (e.g. FCS, F-22, strategic bomber, etc.) under the assumption that state-level warfare is a thing of the past. The international threat environment and our force planning seem to be diverging rapidly, with threats heading in a direction that would suggest the possibility of state-level conflict while we build forces to optimized to re-fight the Iraqi and Afghan insurgencies.

De facto acquiescence in a North Korean nuclear program would require a reconsideration of U.S. strategic planning. More emphasis would need to be given to missile defense. It would be essential to redesign the American deterrent strategy in a world of multiple nuclear powers -- a challenge unprecedented in our experience. The enhanced role of non-state actors with respect to terrorism would have to be addressed. The concepts of deterrence against state actors are familiar, though not in a world of multiple nuclear powers. They have little or no relevance to non-state actors operating by stealth.