Where is my mind?
Popularity Report
![]() |
|||
![]() |
|||
![]() |
|||
![]() |
|||
![]() |
|||
![]() |
URL Tag Cloud
Bookmark History
Saved by 2 people (0 private), first by anonymouse user on 2009-02-06
- Shanta on 2009-04-12 - Tags jerry_fodor , reviews:books , andy_clark , LRB , extended_mind_thesis
- Rgarns on 2009-02-06 - Tags mind , extended-mind , clark , fodor , cogsci
Public Sticky notes
Is what my robot does when it ‘decides’ to change course a sort of thing which if it had happened inside the robot, ‘I would have had no hesitation in accepting as part of [a] cognitive process?’
Highlighted by rgarns
But how am I to understand the hypothesis that it would (or wouldn’t) have changed course if it had collided with the couch in my head?
Highlighted by rgarns
His real argument is that, barring a principled reason for distinguishing between what Otto keeps in his notebook and what Inga keeps in her head, there’s a slippery slope from the one to the other.
Highlighted by rgarns
The mark of the mental is its intensionality (with an ‘s’); that’s to say that mental states have content; they are typically about things.
Highlighted by rgarns
What I should have said isn’t that only what’s literally and unmetaphorically mental has content, but that if something literally and unmetaphorically has content, then either it is mental (part of a mind) or the content is ‘derived’ from something that is mental. ‘Underived’ content (to borrow John Searle’s term) is the mark of the mental; underived content is what minds and only minds have.
Highlighted by rgarns
Externalism needs internalism; but not vice versa. External representation is a side-show; internal representation is ineliminably the main event.
Highlighted by rgarns
your internal model of the world contains stuff that the world itself does not; this happens not just when your beliefs are false but also when they are hypothetical (‘if there are clouds, there will be rain’ can be true even if there aren’t any clouds); or when they are modal (‘it might rain’ can be true even if it doesn’t rain); or when they are in the past or future tense (‘it used to rain here a lot’ can be true even if it doesn’t rain here anymore).
Highlighted by rgarns


Public Comment