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    As part of the Massively Multi-student Online Course led by George Siemans and Stephen Downes, Fall 2008

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Public Comment

on 2008-09-13 by patparslow

presumably information transfer can alse be when the assessment of the total possible states of affairs is increased (e.g. someone 'opens your eyes' to a new possibility) In fact, all that is really required is that there is a change in the assessment of possible states - you may become more convinced that one possibility is more likely than others, without ruling any out - this is still a result of a transfer of information (and happens to fit quite well with Bayesian analysis - not that that is a requirement!)

on 2008-09-13 by patparslow

Knowledge is always generated by the receipt of a signal, even if only the trivial "I received a signal". Communication is (almost) a misnomer for the one-way event - "meaning" has to be negotiated, especially with the multiplicity of different meanings for some words, and the innate capactiy of communication channels to corrupt signals (including attentional problems in the receiver causing mis-understanding).

on 2008-09-13 by patparslow

well... related to the teachers - given the wealth of experiences in each individual's past, it is highly unlikely that the actual state will be the same - it will just have sufficient in common to be able to consider the subject matter as having been learnt. The differences, I would suggest, are what can spark an imaginative leap to new knowledge, as the idea from the "teacher" triggers other memories in the "student"

on 2008-09-13 by patparslow

I think that is a non sequitur - the predicate does not imply the result. It would also be more definitive to say that the concept is distributed throughout our brains - location in minds is hard to define.

on 2008-09-13 by patparslow

barring errors in the system

on 2008-09-13 by patparslow

except that folk psychology is fundamentally connectivist in nature, and capable of holding more than one (potentially contradictory) point of view simultaneously due to its distributed nature.

on 2008-09-13 by patparslow

the context sensitivity is obvious, in my view, whereas I suggest that a private language is feasible - if someone is born deaf and blind and mute, do they really have no language until taught to touch-sign?

on 2008-09-13 by patparslow

Indeed all sense phenomena must be processed by the brain, which is 'trained' throughout life by the experiences it has already had, so in each case, the observation will be unique to the individual.

on 2008-09-14 by patparslow

It also depends on experiences shortly after the fact, with post-event suggestion playing a large role in our subjective view of events.

on 2008-09-14 by patparslow

And quite possibly from mood to mood

on 2008-09-14 by patparslow

or the questioner

on 2008-09-14 by patparslow

stand-alone

on 2008-09-14 by patparslow

The "knowledge" could still be symbolic (though I strongly doubt that it is) because the necessary interpretation of that symbolic knowledge would still be subject to the subjectivity born out of a lifetimes experience.

on 2008-09-14 by patparslow

mental content still exists in this model, in the form of distributed states - it is not isomorphic, however. The isomorphic representation can be seen in the codified signal - language - but this relies on processing at both the sender and receivers end - so the question is still valid.

on 2008-09-14 by patparslow

I do not understand that bit. The meaning is present, but it is formed through the process of negotiation through feedback loops between, and within, nodes in the network.

on 2008-09-14 by patparslow

I would argue that - there is a personal (subjective) state, and there is a probabilistic consensual state.

on 2008-09-14 by patparslow

a reference to semiotics might be handy here

on 2008-09-14 by patparslow

Surely the network is affected by the ability of entities to retain information too - whether they have absolute memory limits, dynamic limits (short term/long term) and the dynamics of recall within the entities - also whether there is any processing of the information within an entity, or whether it merely acts as a relay

on 2008-09-14 by patparslow

is this the salience to the network or the entity? If the entity, are these connections within the network, or within the entity itself?

on 2008-09-14 by patparslow

That sounds a bit dualistic - interpretation by what?

on 2008-09-14 by patparslow

Knowledge is justified belief. Belief is holding a concept without a justification (but may still be correct) Faith is holding a belief without any need or desire for justification. Superstition is holding a belief despite evidence that it is untrue.

on 2008-09-14 by patparslow

what

on 2008-09-14 by patparslow

say

on 2008-09-14 by patparslow

for a period of time - the knowledge (organisation) can be lost. Interestingly, re-finding Waldo becomes easier, probably because the brain is trained to look in certain ways, at certain patterns, and to follow an internal narrative of exploration practices.

on 2008-09-14 by patparslow

Learning as a noun, which, by reference to the first point, is presumably different to knowledge. I am unclear about the definitions here

on 2008-09-14 by patparslow

This is more contextual than the other points - in a stable, non-growth oriented society, this need not be true.

on 2008-09-14 by patparslow

This is the ability to learn, in my opinion

on 2008-09-14 by patparslow

It is probably a mistake to define what other people's intentions are. This need not be true of connectivist learning

on 2008-09-14 by patparslow

Not universally true

on 2008-09-14 by patparslow

That is also true of the preceding model

on 2008-09-14 by patparslow

for all entities in the network...

on 2008-09-14 by patparslow

Assuming that the signal is not modified - an issue here is also positive feedback loops - entities/nodes on the network can amplify a signal if it has sufficient salience for them, and this makes the propagation more succesful

on 2008-09-14 by patparslow

consensual reality

on 2008-09-14 by patparslow

Or bad practice which you are cognitively equipped to recognise as such - this too is a useful learning strategy.

on 2008-09-14 by patparslow

That is 'receiving training' rather than learning (receiving education) I think

on 2008-09-14 by patparslow

not necessarily what we 'want' to see - but what we have been 'trained' to see by life experience to date.

on 2008-09-14 by patparslow

Despite the plethora of comments I have made, I would say this is a cogent and useful discussion of the issues (and one with which I broadly agree in most regards)

on 2008-09-14 by patparslow

Oh bother, those annotations were supposed to be anchored to paragraphs and snippets

Public Sticky notes

In practice, these principles may be realized in the following design principles. It is worth noting at this juncture that these principles are intended to describe not only networks but also network learning, to show how network learning differs from traditional learning. The idea is that each principle confers an advantage over non-network systems, and that the set, therefore, may be used as a means of evaluating new technology. This is a tentative set of principles, based on observation and pattern recognition. It is not a definitive list, and indeed, it is likely that there cannot be a definitive list.

Highlighted by olebrudvik

We begin with the nature of a network itself. In any network, there will be three major elements:

–        Entities, that is, the things that are connected that send and receive signals

–        Connections, that is, the link or channel between entities (may be represented as physical or virtual)

–        Signals, that is, the message sent between entities. Note that meaning is not inherent in signal and must be interpreted by the receiver

In an environment of this description, then, networks may vary according to a certain set of properties:

–        Density, or how many other entities each entity is connected to

–        Speed, or how quickly a message moves to an entity (can be measured in time or ‘hops’)

–        Flow, or how much information an entity processes, which includes messages sent and received in addition to transfers of messages for other entities

–        Plasticity, or, how frequently connections created, abandoned

–        Degree of connectedness – is a function of density, speed, flow and plasticity

Given this description of networks, we can identify the essential elements of network semantics.

Highlighted by olebrudvik

First, context, that is, the localization of entities in a network. Each context is unique – entities see the network differently, experience the world differently. Context is required in order to interpret signals, that is, each signal means something different depending on the perspective of the entity receiving it.

Second, salience, that is, the relevance or importance of a message. This amounts to the similarity between one pattern of connectivity and another. If a signal creates the activation of a set of connections that were previously activated, then this signal is salient. Meaning is created from context and messages via salience.

Third, emergence, that is, the development of patterns in the network. Emergence is a process of resonance or synchronicity, not creation. We do not create emergent phenomena. Rather emergence phenomena are more like commonalities in patterns of perception. It requires an interpretation to be recognized; this happens when a pattern becomes salient to a perceiver.

Fourth, memory is the persistence of patterns of connectivity, and in particular, those patterns of connectivity that result from, and result in, salient signals or perceptions.

Highlighted by olebrudvik

Connective semantics is therefore derived from what might be called connectivist ‘pragmatics’, that is, that actual use of networks in practice. In our particular circumstance we would examine how networks are used to support learning. The methodology employed is to look at multiple examples and to determine what patterns may be discerned. These patterns cannot be directly communicated. But instances of these patterns may be communicated, thus allowing readers to (more or less) ‘get the idea’.

Highlighted by olebrudvik

For example, in order to illustrate the observation that ‘knowledge is distributed’ I have frequently appealed to the story of the 747. In a nutshell, I ask, “who knows how to make a 747 fly from London to Toronto?” The short answer is that nobody knows how to do this – no one person could design a 747, manufacture the parts (including tires and aircraft engines), take it off, fly it properly, tend to the passengers, navigate, and land it successfully. The knowledge is distributed across a network of people, and the phenomenon of ‘flying a 747’ can exist at all only because of the connections between the constituent members of that network.

Highlighted by olebrudvik

Or, another story: if knowledge is a network phenomenon, then, is it necessary for all the elements of a bit of knowledge to be stored in one’s own mind? Karen Stephenson writes, “I store my knowledge in my friends.” This assertion constitutes an explicit recognition that what we ‘know’ is embedded in our network of connections to each other, to resources, to the world. Siemens writes, “Self-organization on a personal level is a micro-process of the larger self-organizing knowledge constructs created within corporate or institutional environments. The capacity to form connections between sources of information, and thereby create useful information patterns, is required to learn in our knowledge economy.”

Highlighted by olebrudvik

This approach to learning has been captured under the heading of ‘connectivism’. In his paper of the same name, George Siemens articulates the major theses:

  • Learning and knowledge rests in diversity of opinions.

  • Learning is a process of connecting specialized nodes or information sources.

  • Learning may reside in non-human appliances.

  • Capacity to know more is more critical than what is currently known

  • Nurturing and maintaining connections is needed to facilitate continual learning.

  • Ability to see connections between fields, ideas, and concepts is a core skill.

  • Currency (accurate, up-to-date knowledge) is the intent of all connectivist learning activities.

  • Decision-making is in itself a learning process. Choosing what to learn and the meaning of incoming information is seen through the lens of a shifting reality. While there is a right answer now, it may be wrong tomorrow due to alterations in the information climate affecting the decision.

Highlighted by olebrudvik

Is this the definitive statement of network learning? Probably not. But it is developed in the classic mold of network learning, through a process of immersion into the network and recognition of salient patterns. What sort of network? The following list is typical of what might be called ‘network’ practices online (I won’t draw these out in detail because there are dozens of papers and presentations that do this):

Practice: Content Authoring and Delivery

–        Numerous content authoring systems on the web…

–        Weblogs – Blogger, Wordpress, LiveJournal, Moveable Type, more

–        Content Management Systems – Drupal, PostNuke, Plone, Scoop, and many more…

–        Audio – Audacity – and audioblogs.com – and Podcasting

–        Digital imagery and video – and let’s not forget Flickr

–        Collaborative authoring – Writely, Hula, the wiki

 

Practice: Organize, Syndicate Sequence, Deliver

–        Aggregation of content metadata – RSS and Atom, OPML, FOAF, even DC and LOM

–        Aggregators – NewsGator, Bloglines – Edu_RSS

–        Aggregation services – Technorati, Blogdex, PubSub

–        More coming – the Semantic Social Network

 

Practice: Identity and Authorization

–        A raft of centralized (or Federated) approaches – from Microsoft Passport to Liberty to Shibboleth

–        Also various locking and encryption systems

–        But nobody wants these

–        Distributed DRM – Creative Commons, ODRL…

–        Distributed Identification management – Sxip, LID…

 

Practice: Chatting, Phoning, Conferencing

–        Bulletin board systems and chat rooms, usually attached to the aforementioned content management systems such as Drupal, Plone, PostNuke, Scoop

–        Your students use this, even if you don’t: ICQ, AIM, YIM, and some even use MSN Messenger

–        Audioconferencing? Skype…Or NetworkEducationWare…

–        Videoconferencing? Built into AIM… and Skype

Highlighted by olebrudvik

What happens,” I asked, “when online learning ceases to be like a medium, and becomes more like a platform? What happens when online learning software ceases to be a type of content-consumption tool, where learning is "delivered," and becomes more like a content-authoring tool, where learning is created?”

The answer turns out to be a lot like Web 2.0: “The model of e-learning as being a type of content, produced by publishers, organized and structured into courses, and consumed by students, is turned on its head. Insofar as there is content, it is used rather than read— and is, in any case, more likely to be produced by students than courseware authors. And insofar as there is structure, it is more likely to resemble a language or a conversation rather than a book or a manual.”

Highlighted by olebrudvik

In the days since this shift was recognized a growing community of educators and developers has been gathering around a model of online learning typified by this diagram authored by Scott Wilson (and remixed by various others since then):

 

Figure 1: Future VLE

http://www.cetis.ac.uk/members/scott/blogview?entry=20050125170206

Highlighted by olebrudvik

In an environment such as this, the nature of design changes. In a typical computer program, the design will be specified with an algorithm or flowchart. Software will be described as performing a specific process, with specified (and often controlled) inputs and outputs. In a distributed environment, however, the design is no longer defined as a type of process. Rather, designers need to characterize the nature of the connections between the constituent entities.

Highlighted by olebrudvik

What are the core principles that will characterize such a description? The internet itself illustrates a sound set of principles, grounded by two major characteristics: simple services with realistic scope. “Simple service or simple devices with realistic scope are usually able to offer a superior user experience compared to a complex, multi–purpose service or device.” Or as David Weinberger describes the network: small pieces, loosely joined.

Highlighted by olebrudvik

We compensate for these weaknesses by recognizing that a single point of view is insufficient; we distribute what constitutes an 'observation' through a process of description and verification. If one person says he saw a zombie, we take such a claim sceptically; if a hundred people say they saw zombies, we take it more seriously, and if a process is described whereby anyone who is interested can see a zombie for themselves, the observation is accepted. In other words, the veracity of our observations is not guaranteed by the observation, but by an observational methodology.

Highlighted by olebrudvik

1. Effective networks are decentralized. Centralized networks have a characteristic ‘star’ shape, where some entities have many connections while the vast majority have few. This is typical of, say a broadcast network or the method of a teacher in a classroom. Decentralized networks, by contrast, form a mesh. The weight of connections and the flow of information is distributed. This balanced load results in a more stable network, with no single point of failure.

2. Effective networks are distributed. Network entities reside in different physical locations. This reduces the risk of network failure. It also reduces need for major infrastructure, such as powerful servers, large bandwidth, and massive storage. Examples of distributed networks include peer-to-peer networks, such as Kazaa, Gnutella and content syndication networks, such as RSS. The emphasis of such systems is on sharing, not copying; local copies, if they exist, are temporary.

3. Effective networks disintermediated. That is, they eliminate ‘mediation’, the barrier between source and receiver. Examples of disintermediation include the bypassing of editors, replacing peer review prior to publication with recommender systems subsequent to publication. Or of the replacement of traditional news media and broadcasters with networks of news bloggers. And, crucially, the removal of the intermediate teacher that stands between knowledge and the student. The idea is to, where possible, provide direct access to information and services. The purpose of mediation, if any, is to manage flow, not information, to reduce the volume of information, not the type of information.

4. In effective networks, content and services are disaggregated. Units of content should be as small as possible and content should not be ‘bundled’. Instead, the organization and structure of content and services is created by the receiver . This allows the integration of new information and services with the old, of popular news and services with those in an individual’s particular niche interests. This was the idea behind learning objects; the learning object was sometimes defined as the ‘smallest possible unit of instruction’. The assembly of learning objects into pre-packaged ‘courses’ defeats this, however, obviating any advantage the disaggregating of content may have provided.

5. In an effective network, content and services are dis-integrated. That is to say, entities in a network are not ‘components’ of one another. For example, plug-ins or required software to be avoided. What this means in practice is that the structure of the message is logically distinct from the type of entity sending or receiving it. The message is coded in a common ‘language’ where the code is open, not proprietary. So no particular software or device is needed to receive the code. This is the idea of standards, but where standards evolve rather than being created, and where they are adopted by agreement, not requirement.

Highlighted by olebrudvik

6. An effective network is democratic. Entities in a network are autonomous; they have the freedom to negotiate connections with other entities, and they have the freedom to send and receive information. Diversity in a network is an asset, as it confers flexibility and adaptation. It also allows the network as a whole to represent more than just the part. Control of the entities in a network, therefore, should be impossible. Indeed, in an effective network, even where control seems desirable, it is not practical. This condition – which may be thought of as the semantic condition – is what distinguishes networks from groups (see below).

7. An effective network is dynamic. A network is a fluid, changing entity, because without change, growth and adaptation are not possible. This is sometimes described as the ‘plasticity’ of a network. It is through this process of change that new knowledge is discovered, where the creation of connections is a core function.

8. An effective network is desegregated. For example, in network learning, learning is not thought of as a Separate Domain. Hence, there is no need for learning-specific tools and processes. Learning is instead thought of as a part of living, of work, of play. The same tools we use to perform day-to-day activities are the tools we use to learn. Viewed more broadly, this condition amounts to seeing the network as infrastructure. Computing, communicating and learning are not something we ‘go some place to do’. Instead, we think of network resources as similar to a utility, like electricity, like water, like telephones. The network is everywhere.

It should be noted that though some indication of the justification for these methodological principles has been offered in the list above, along with some examples, this list is in essence descriptive. In other words, what is claimed here is that successful networks in fact adhere to these principles. The why of this is the subject of the next few sections.

 

Highlighted by olebrudvik

Knowledge is a network phenomenon. To 'know' something is to be organized in a certain way, to exhibit patterns of connectivity. To 'learn' is to acquire certain patterns. This is as true for a community as it is for an individual.

Highlighted by olebrudvik

But it should be self-evident that mere organization is not the only determinate of what constitutes, if you will, 'good' knowledge as opposed to 'bad' (or 'false') knowledge. Consider public knowledge. People form themselves into communities, develop common language and social bonds, and then proceed to invade Europe or commit mass suicide. Nor is personal knowledge any reliable counterbalance to this. People are as inclined to internalize the dysfunctional as the utile, the self-destructive as the empowering. Some types of knowledge (that is, some ways of being organized, whether socially or personally) are destructive and unstable.

These are examples of cascade phenomena. In social sciences the same phenomenon might be referred to as the bandwagon effect. Such phenomena exist in the natural world as well. The sweep of the plague through medieval society, the failure of one hydro plant after another, the bubbles in the stock market. Cascade phenomena occur when some event or property sweeps through the network. Cascade phenomena are in one sense difficult to explain and in another sense deceptively simple.

The sense in which they are simple to explain is mathematical. If a signal has more than an even chance of being propagated from one entity in the network to the next, and if the network is fully connected, then the signal will eventually propagate to every entity in the network. The speed at which this process occurs is a property of the connectivity of the network. In (certain) random and scale free networks, including hierarchal networks, it takes very few connections to jump from one side of the network to the other. Cascade phenomena sweep through densely connected networks very rapidly.

The sense in which they are hard to explain is related to the question of why they exist at all. Given the destructive nature of cascade phenomena, it would make more sense to leave entities in the network unconnected (much like Newton escaped the plague by isolating himself). Terminating all the connections would prevent cascade phenomena. However, it would also prevent any possibility of human knowledge, any possibility of a knowing society.

Highlighted by olebrudvik

. Perception itself consists of selective filtering and interpretation (pattern detection!) . The mind supplies sensations that are not there. Even a cautiously aware and reflective perceiver can be misled.

Highlighted by olebrudvik

Learning Networks and Connective Knowledge

Highlighted by siegenthaler

Learning Networks and Connective Knowledge

Highlighted by jason4myers

The purpose of this paper is to outline some of the thinking behind new e-learning technology, including e-portfolios and personal learning environments. Part of this thinking is centered around the theory of connectivism, which asserts that knowledge - and therefore the learning of knowledge - is distributive, that is, not located in any
given place (and therefore not 'transferred' or 'transacted' per se) but rather consists of the network of connections formed from experience and interactions with a knowing community. And another part of this thinking is centered around the new, and the newly empowered, learner, the member of the net generation, who is thinking and interacting in new ways. These trends combine to form what is sometimes called 'e-learning 2.0' -
an approach to learning that is based on conversation and interaction, on sharing, creation and participation, on learning not as a separate activity, but rather, as embedded in meaningful activities such as games or workflows.

Highlighted by tsuomela

The purpose of this paper is to outline some of the thinking behind new e-learning technology, including e-portfolios and personal learning environments. Part of this thinking is centered around the theory of connectivism, which asserts that knowledge - and therefore the learning of knowledge - is distributive, that is, not located in any
given place (and therefore not 'transferred' or 'transacted' per se) but rather consists of the network of connections formed from experience and interactions with a knowing community. And another part of this thinking is centered around the new, and the newly empowered, learner, the member of the net generation, who is thinking and interacting in new ways. These trends combine to form what is sometimes called 'e-learning 2.0' -
an approach to learning that is based on conversation and interaction, on sharing, creation and participation, on learning not as a separate activity, but rather, as embedded in meaningful activities such as games or workflows.

Highlighted by siegenthaler

connectivism

Highlighted by fsnow319

connectivism, which asserts that knowledge - and therefore the learning of knowledge - is distributive, that is, not located in any
given place (and therefore not 'transferred' or 'transacted' per se) but rather consists of the network of connections formed from experience and interactions with a knowing community

Highlighted by robdmillusa

not located in any
given place (and therefore not 'transferred' or 'transacted' per se) but rather consists of the network of connections formed from experience and interactions with a knowing community

Highlighted by fsnow319

Network Semantics and Connective Learning

If we accept that something like the network theory of learning is true, then we are faced with a knowledge and learning environment very different from what we are used to. In the strictest sense, there is no semantics in network learning, because there is no meaning in network learning (and hence, the constructivist practice of ‘making meaning’ is literally meaningless).

Traditionally, what a sentence ‘means’ is the (truth of falsity of) the state of the world it represents. However, on a network theory of knowledge, there is no such state of the world to which this meaning can be affixed. This is not because there is no such state of the world. The world could most certainly exist, and there is no contradiction in saying that a person’s neural states are caused by world events. However, it does mean that there is no particular state of the world that corresponds with (is isomorphic to) a particular mental state. This is because the mental state is embedded in a sea of context and presuppositions that are completely opaque to the state of the world.

How, then, do we express ourselves? How do we distinguish between true and false – what, indeed, does it even mean to say that something is true and false? The answer to these questions is going to be different for each of us. They will be embedded in a network of assumptions and beliefs about the nature of meaning, truth and falsity. In order to get at a response, therefore, it will be necessary to outline what may only loosely be called ‘network semantics’

Highlighted by olebrudvik

e-learning 2.0

Highlighted by shimrodmimir

The Traditional Theory: Cognitivism

Highlighted by wisely

Cognitivism is probably best thought of as a response to behaviourism

Highlighted by robdmillusa

It provides an explicit description of the ‘inner workings’ of the mind that behaviourism ignores. It is founded on the view that the behaviourist assertion that there are no mental events is in a certain sense implausible, if only by introspection.

Highlighted by akochan

The Traditional Theory: Cognitivism

Highlighted by siegenthaler

. It is founded on the view that the behaviourist assertion that there are no mental events is in a certain sense implausible

Highlighted by robdmillusa

The dominant theory of online and distance learning may be characterized as conforming to a ‘cognitivist’ theory of knowledge and learning. Cognitivism is probably best thought of as a response to behaviourism. It provides an explicit description of the ‘inner workings’ of the mind that behaviourism ignores.

Highlighted by wisely

cognitivists defend an approach that may be called ‘folk psychology’. “In our everyday social interactions we both predict and explain behavior, and our explanations are couched in a mentalistic vocabulary which includes terms like ‘belief’ and ‘desire’.” The argument, in a nutshell, is that the claims of folk psychology are literally true, that there is, for example, an entity in the mind corresponding to the belief that 'Paris is the capital of France', and that this belief is, in fact, what might loosely be called 'brain writing' - or, more precisely, there is a one-to-one correspondence between a person's brain states and the sentence itself.

Highlighted by wisely

n other words, cognitivists defend an approach that may be called ‘folk psychology’.

Highlighted by siegenthaler

communication theory, the idea that communication consists of information that flows through a channel. When we join folk psychology with communications theory, we get the idea that there is something like mental content that is in some way transmitted from a sender to a receiver. That we send ideas or beliefs or desires thought his channel. Or at the very least, that we send linguistic or non-linguistic (audio music and video images, for example) representations of these mental entities.

Highlighted by wisely

thought his

Highlighted by patparslow

His view is that the effectiveness of communication is improved through interaction. Instead of viewing communication as a one-time event, in which information is sent from a sender and received by a receiver, the transfer of information is enabled through a series of communications, such that the receiver sends messages back to the sender, or to third parties

Highlighted by robdmillusa

What is happening is that information theorists, such as Dretske, along with educational theorists, such as Moore, are transferring the properties of a physical medium, in this case, the communication of content via electronic or other signals, to the realm of the mental

Highlighted by robdmillusa

Moore's contribution

Highlighted by wisely

. Instead of viewing communication as a one-time event, in which information is sent from a sender and received by a receiver, the transfer of information is enabled through a series of communications, such that the receiver sends messages back to the sender, or to third parties. This is similar to the 'checksum' mechanism in computer communications, where the receiving computer sends back a string of bits to the sender in order to confirm that the message has been received correctly. Minimally, through this communication, a process of verification is enabled;

Highlighted by wisely

What is happening is that information theorists, such as Dretske, along with educational theorists, such as Moore, are transferring the properties of a physical medium, in this case, the communication of content via electronic or other signals, to the realm of the mental.

Highlighted by akochan

information theorists

Highlighted by wisely

are transferring the properties of a physical medium, in this case, the communication of content via electronic or other signals, to the realm of the mental.

Highlighted by wisely

there is something we'll call 'mental content' which is an isomorphism between physical states of the brain and the semantical content transmitted to and received by students, who either in some way absorb or construct a mental state that is the same as the teacher's - a 'shared experience'.

Highlighted by wisely

We may contrast cognitivism, which is a causal theory of mind, with connectionism, which is an emergentist theory of min

Highlighted by robdmillusa

The Emergentist Alternative and the Argument Against Cognitivism

Highlighted by wisely

The allure of a causal theory is also that there appears to be no alternative. If there is no causal connection between teacher and learner, then how can any learning take place, except through some sort of divine intervention? Once we have established and begun to describe the causal process through which information is transacted from teacher to learner, we have pretty much claimed the field; any further account along these lines is an enhancement, an embellishment, but certainly not something new.

Highlighted by wisely

The Emergentist Alternative and the Argument Against Cognitivism

Highlighted by siegenthaler

emergentist theory

Highlighted by wisely

There is, however, an alternative. We may contrast cognitivism, which is a causal theory of mind, with connectionism, which is an emergentist theory of mind. This is not to say that connectionism (see also) does away with causation altogether; it is not a ‘hand of God’ theory.  It allows that there is a physical, causal connection between entities, and this is what makes communication possible. But where it differs is, crucially: the transfer of information does not reduce to this physical substrate. Contrary to the communications-theoretical account, the new theory is a non-reductive theory. The contents of communications, such as sentences, are not isomorphic with some mental state.

Highlighted by wisely

We may contrast cognitivism, which is a causal theory of mind, with connectionism, which is an emergentist theory of mind.

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Philosophers have come up with the concept of 'supervenience' to describe something that is not the same as (i.e., not reducible to) physical phenomena, but which are nonetheless dependent on them. Thus, collections of physical states may share the same non-physical state; this non-physical state may be described as a 'pattern', or variously, 'a mental state', 'information', a 'belief', or whatever.

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Knowledge (and other mental states, concepts, and the like) when represented in this way are 'distributed' - that is, there is no discrete entity that is (or could be) an 'instance' of that knowledge.

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it is becoming increasingly evident that what we call 'mental contents' do not resemble sentences, much less physical objects, at all.

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Randall O’Reilly

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explicitly rejects the ‘isomorphic’ view of mental contents, and instead describes a network of distributed representations. "Instead of viewing brain areas as being specialized for specific representational content (e.g., color, shape, location, etc), areas are specialized for specific computational functions by virtue of having different neural parameters...

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"A distributed representation is one in which meaning is not captured by a single symbolic unit, but rather arises from the interaction of a set of units, normally in a network of some sort."

As noted in the same article, "The concept of distributed representation is a product of joint developments in the neurosciences and in connectionist work on recognition tasks (Churchland and Sejnowski 1992). Fundamentally, a distributed representation is one in which meaning is not captured by a single symbolic unit, but rather arises from the interaction of a set of units, normally in a network of some sort."

To illustrate this concept, I have been asking people to think of the concept 'Paris'. If 'Paris' were represented by a simple symbol set, we would all mean the same thing when we say 'Paris'. But in fact, we each mean a collection of different things and none of our collections is the same. Therefore, in our own minds, the concept 'Paris' is a loose association of a whole bunch of different things, and hence the concept 'Paris' exists in no particular place in our minds, but rather, is scattered throughout our minds.

Now what the article is saying is that human brains are like computers - but not like the computers as described above, with symbols and programs and all that, but like computers when they are connected together in a network.

"The brain as a whole operates more like a social network than a digital computer... the computer-like features of the prefrontal cortex broaden the social networks, helping the brain become more flexible in processing novel and symbolic information." Understanding 'where the car is parked' is like understanding how one kind of function applies on the brain's distributed representation, while understanding 'the best place to park the car' is like how a different function applies to the same distributed representation.

The analogy with the network of computers is a good one (and people who develop social network software are sometimes operating with these concepts of neural mechanisms specifically in mind). The actual social network itself - a set of distributed and interlinked entities, usually people, as represented by websites or pages - constitutes a type of distributed representation. A 'meme' - like, say, the Friday Five - is distributed across that network; it exists in no particular place.

Specific mental operations, therefore, are like thinking of functions applied to this social network. For example, if I were to want to find 'the most popular bloggers' I would need to apply a set of functions to that network. I would need to represent each entity as a 'linking' entity. I would need to cluster types of links (to eliminate self-referential links and spam). I would then need to apply my function (now my own view here, and possibly O'Reilly's, though I don't read it specifically in his article, is that to apply a function is to create additional neural layers that act as specialized filters - this would contrast with, say, Technorati, which polls each individual entity and then applies an algorithm to it).

This theory, stated simply, is that human thought amounts to patterns of interactions in neural networks. More precisely, patterns of input phenomena - such as sensory perceptions - cause or create patterns of connections between neurons in the brain. These connections are associative - that is, connections between two neurons form when the two neurons are active at the same time, and weaken when they are inactive or active at different times. See, for example, Donald Hebb's 'The Organization of Behavior', which outlines what has come to be called 'Hebbian associationism'.

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O’Reilly is proposing is a functionalist architecture over distributed representation

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"Functionalism in the philosophy of mind is the doctrine that what makes something a mental state of a particular type does not depend on its internal constitution, but rather on the way it functions, or the role it plays, in the system of which it is a part."

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For example, when I say, "What makes something a learning object is how we use the learning object," I am asserting a functionalist approach to the definition of learning objects (people are so habituated to essentialist definitions that my definition does not even appear on lists of definitions of learning objects).

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"A distributed representation is one in which meaning is not captured by a single symbolic unit, but rather arises from the interaction of a set of units, normally in a network of some sort."

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in our own minds, the concept 'Paris' is a loose association of a whole bunch of different things, and hence the concept 'Paris' exists in no particular place in our minds, but rather, is scattered throughout our minds.

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Now what the article is saying is that human brains are like computers - but not like the computers as described above, with symbols and programs and all that, but like computers when they are connected together in a network.

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Now what the article is saying is that human brains are like computers - but not like the computers as described above, with symbols and programs and all that, but like computers when they are connected together in a network.

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"The brain as a whole operates more like a social network than a digital computer... the computer-like features of the prefrontal cortex broaden the social networks, helping the brain become more flexible in processing novel and symbolic information." Understanding 'where the car is parked' is like understanding how one kind of function applies on the brain's distributed representation, while understanding 'the best place to park the car' is like how a different function applies to the same distributed representation.

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As we examine the emergentist theory of mind we can arrive at five major implications of this approach for educational theorists:

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first, knowledge is subsymbolic. Mere possession of the words does not mean that there is knowledge; the possession of knowledge does not necessarily result in the possession of the words

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second, knowledge is distributed

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As we examine the emergentist theory of mind we can arrive at five major implications of this approach for educational theorists:

- first, knowledge is subsymbolic. Mere possession of the words does not mean that there is knowledge; the possession of knowledge does not necessarily result in the possession of the words (and for much more on this, see Michael Polanyi's discussion of 'tacit knowledge' in 'Personal Knowledge').

- second, knowledge is distributed. There is no specific 'mental entity' that corresponds to the belief that 'Paris is the capital of France'. What we call that 'knowledge' is (an indistinguishable) pattern of connections between neurons. See, for example, Geoffrey Hinton, 'Learning Distributed Representations of Concepts'.

- third, knowledge is interconnected. The same neuron that is a part of 'Paris is the capital of France' might also be a part of 'My dog is named Fred'. It is important to note that this is a non-symbolic interconnection - this is the basis for non-rational associations, such as are described in the recent Guardian article, 'Where Belief is Born'

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hird, knowledge is interconnected

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fourth, knowledge is personal.

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fifth, what we call 'knowledge' (or 'belief', or 'memory') is an emergent phenomenon

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This theory, stated simply, is that human thought amounts to patterns of interactions in neural networks. More precisely, patterns of input phenomena - such as sensory perceptions - cause or create patterns of connections between neurons in the brain. These connections are associative - that is, connections between two neurons form when the two neurons are active at the same time, and weaken when they are inactive or active at different times. See, for example, Donald Hebb's 'The Organization of Behavior', which outlines what has come to be called 'Hebbian associationism'.

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- fourth, knowledge is personal. Your 'belief' that 'Paris is the capital of France' is quite literally different from my belief that 'Paris is the capital of France'. If you think about it, this must be the case - otherwise Gestalt tests would be useless; we would all utter the same word when shown the same picture.

- fifth, what we call 'knowledge' (or 'belief', or 'memory') is an emergent phenomenon. Specifically, it is not 'in' the brain itself, or even 'in' the connections themselves, because there is no 'canonical' set of connections that corresponds with 'Paris is the capital of France'. It is, rather (and carefully stated), a recognition of a pattern in a set of neural events (if we are introspecting) or behavioural events (if we are observing). We infer to mental contents the same way we watch Donald Duck on TV - we think we see something, but that something is not actually there - it's just an organization of pixels.

This set of features constitutes a mechanism for evaluating whether a cognitivist theory or a connectivist theory is likely to be true. In my own mind (and in my own writing, as this was the subject of my first published paper, ‘Why Equi Fails’), the mechanism can be summed in one empirical test: context sensitivity.

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The Argument Against Cognitivism

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For the presumption of these theories is that, when you believe that 'Paris is the capital of France' and when I believe that 'Paris is the capital of France', that we believe the same thing, and that, importantly, we share the same mental state, and hence can be reasonably relied upon to demonstrate the same semantic information when prompted.

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five major implications of this approach for educational theorists:

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The Argument Against Cognitivism

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first, knowledge is subsymbolic. Mere possession of the words does not mean that there is knowledge; the possession of knowledge does not necessarily result in the possession of the words (and for much more on this, see Michael Polanyi's discussion of 'tacit knowledge' in 'Personal Knowledge').

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first, knowledge is subsymbolic.

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second, knowledge is distributed.

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What we call that 'knowledge' is (an indistinguishable) pattern of connections between neurons.

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second, knowledge is distributed

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third, knowledge is interconnected. The same neuron that is a part of 'Paris is the capital of France' might also be a part of 'My dog is named Fred'.

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third, knowledge is interconnected

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emergent phenomenon

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fourth, knowledge is personal. Your 'belief' that 'Paris is the capital of France' is quite literally different from my belief that 'Paris is the capital of France'

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fifth, what we call 'knowledge' (or 'belief', or 'memory') is an emergent phenomenon. Specifically, it is not 'in' the brain itself, or even 'in' the connections themselves, because there is no 'canonical' set of connections that corresponds with 'Paris is the capital of France'. It is, rather (and carefully stated), a recognition of a pattern in a set of neural events (if we are introspecting) or behavioural events (if we are observing). We infer to mental contents the same way we watch Donald Duck on TV - we think we see something, but that something is not actually there - it's just an organization of pixels.

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fourth, knowledge is personal.

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fifth, what we call 'knowledge' (or 'belief', or 'memory') is an emergent phenomenon

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If learning is context-sensitive then the 'language of thought' hypothesis fails, and the rest of folk psychology along with it. For the presumption of these theories is that, when you believe that 'Paris is the capital of France' and when I believe that 'Paris is the capital of France', that we believe the same thing, and that, importantly, we share the same mental state, and hence can be reasonably relied upon to demonstrate the same semantic information when prompted.

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context sensitivity.

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If learning is context-sensitive then the 'language of thought' hypothesis fails, and the rest of folk psychology along with it.

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If, as asserted above, what counts as knowledge of even basic things like the meanings of words and the cause of events is sensitive to context, then it seems clear that such knowledge is not a stand-along symbolic representation of that knowledge, since representations would not be, could not be, context sensitive. Rather, what is happening is that each person is experiencing a mental state that is at best seen as an approximation of what it is that is being said in words or experienced in nature, an approximation that is framed and indeed comprehensible only from which the rich set of world views, previous experiences and frames in which it embedded.

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So I’ve concluded that 'language of thought' hypothesis could not possibly succeed, nor folk psychology either. Because it turns out that not only language but the whole range of phenomena associated with knowledge and learning are context-sensitive. Or so the philosophers say.

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- Wilbert Quine, in 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' and in 'Word and Object', shows that observation itself is context-sensitive, that there is no knowable one-to-one matching between sense-phenomena and the words used to describe them; in 'On the Indeterminacy of Translation' he illustrates this with the famous 'gavagai' example: when a native speaker uses the word 'gavagai' there is no empirical way to know whether he means 'rabbit' or 'the physically incarnate manifestation of my ancestor'

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meaning is context sensitive

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- Ludwig Wittgenstein

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If this is the case, then the concepts of what it is to know and what it is to teach are very different from the traditional theories that dominate distance education today. Because if learning is not the transfer of mental contents – if there is, indeed, no such mental content that exists to be transported – then we need to ask, what is it that we are attempting to do when we attempt to teach and learn.

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If we accept that something like the network theory of learning is true, then we are faced with a knowledge and learning environment very different from what we are used to. In the strictest sense, there is no semantics in network learning, because there is no meaning in network learning (and hence, the constructivist practice of ‘making meaning’ is literally meaningless)

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Norwood Russell Hanson, in 'Patterns of Discovery', argues, in my view successfully, that causal explanations are context-sensitive. 'What was the cause of the accident?' It depends on who you ask - the police officer will point to the speed, the urban planner will point to the road design, the driver will point to the visibility.

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- Wilbert Quine,

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emergent phenomenon.

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George Lakoff, in 'Women, Fire and Dangerous Things', shows that categories are context sensitive (contra Saul Kripke); that what makes two things 'the same' varies from culture to culture, and indeed (as evidenced from some of his more recent political writings) from 'frame' to 'frame'

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Bas C. van Fraassen in ‘The Scientific Image’ shows that explanations are context sensitive. 'Why are the roses growing here?' may be answered in a number of ways, depending on what alternative explanations are anticipated. 'Because someone planted them.' 'Because they were well fertilized.' 'Because the chlorophyll in the leaves converts the energy of the Sun into glucose' are all acceptable answers, the correct one of which depends on the presuppositions inherent in the question.

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ith the nature of a network itself. In any network, there will be three major elements:

–        Entities, that is, the things that are connected that send and receive signals

–        Connections, that is, the link or channel between entities (may be represented as physical or virtual)

–        Signals, that is, the message sent between entities. Note that meaning is not inherent in signal and must be interpreted by the receiver

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David K. Lewis and Robert C. Stalnaker argue that the counterfactuals and modalities are context sensitive (though Lewis, if asked, would probably deny it). The truth of a sentence like 'brakeless trains are dangerous' depends, not on observation, but rather, on the construction of a 'possible world' that is relevantly similar (Stalnaker uses the word 'salience') to our own, but what counts as 'relevant' depends on the context in which the hypothetical is being considered.

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ach person is experiencing a mental state that is at best seen as an approximation of what it is that is being said in words or experienced in nature, an approximation that is framed and indeed comprehensible only from which the rich set of world views, previous experiences and frames in which it embedded.

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If, as asserted above, what counts as knowledge of even basic things like the meanings of words and the cause of events is sensitive to context, then it seems clear that such knowledge is not a stand-along symbolic representation of that knowledge, since representations would not be, could not be, context sensitive. Rather, what is happening is that each person is experiencing a mental state that is at best seen as an approximation of what it is that is being said in words or experienced in nature, an approximation that is framed and indeed comprehensible only from which the rich set of world views, previous experiences and frames in which it embedded.

If this is the case, then the concepts of what it is to know and what it is to teach are very different from the traditional theories that dominate distance education today. Because if learning is not the transfer of mental contents – if there is, indeed, no such mental content that exists to be transported – then we need to ask, what is it that we are attempting to do when we attempt to teach and learn.

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learning is not the transfer of mental contents

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In an environment of this description, then, networks may vary according to a certain set of properties:

–        Density, or how many other entities each entity is connected to

–        Speed, or how quickly a message moves to an entity (can be measured in time or ‘hops’)

–        Flow, or how much information an entity processes, which includes messages sent and received in addition to transfers of messages for other entities

–        Plasticity, or, how frequently connections created, abandoned

–        Degree of connectedness – is a function of density, speed, flow and plasticity

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If this is the case, then the concepts of what it is to know and what it is to teach are very different from the traditional theories

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if learning is not the transfer of mental contents – if there is, indeed, no such mental content that exists to be transported – then we need to ask, what is it that we are attempting to do when we attempt to teach and learn.

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Network Semantics and Connective Learning

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Network Semantics and Connective Learning

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Traditionally, what a sentence ‘means’ is the (truth of falsity of) the state of the world it represents. However, on a network theory of knowledge, there is no such state of the world to which this meaning can be affixed. This is not because there is no such state of the world. The world could most certainly exist, and there is no contradiction in saying that a person’s neural states are caused by world events. However, it does mean that there is no particular state of the world that corresponds with (is isomorphic to) a particular mental state. This is because the mental state is embedded in a sea of context and presuppositions that are completely opaque to the state of the world.

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How, then, do we expres